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6

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
I

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff-Respondent, :
v.

:

WILLIAM SILAS CASE,

:

Case No. 860201-CA

Category No. 2

Defendant-Appellant. :
STATEMENT QF JSSUES PRESENTED ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
The following issues are presented in the Statefs
petition for rehearing:
1.

Did the Court incorrectly conclude that the trial

court erroneously admitted the preliminary hearing testimony of
the State's chief witness at trial?
2.

Assuming that the trial court properly admitted the

preliminary hearing testimony, should the Court have affirmed
defendant's conviction notwithstanding the trial court's failure
to suppress certain evidence?
STATEMENT QF TAP CASE
Defendant, William Silas Case, was charged with
aggravated assault, a third degree felony, under UTAH CODE ANN, §
76-5-103 (1978) (R. 5). After a jury trial, he was found guilty
of that offense (R. 42). The court sentenced him to a term of
zero to five years in the Utah State Prison (R. 43).

STATEMENT QF FACTS
The State agrees with most of the fact statement set
forth in the Court's opinion in State v. Case,

P.2d

, Ut.

Ct. App. No. 860201-CA, slip op. at 1-2 (filed April 15, 1987) (a
-1-

copy of the entire opinion is attached as Appendix A ) . However,
the Court's statement that the cassette of Suzzanne McPerrson's
preliminary hearing testimony was "likely taken into the jury
room during deliberation and may have been played there as well
as during the trial," slip op. at 2, is not supported by the
record on appeal.

Speculation about whether the cassette was

either taken into the jury room or replayed there should have no
bearing on the Court's decision.

See State v. Bingham, 684 P.2d

43, 46 (Utah 1984) (the Court cannot rule on matters outside the
trial court record); State v. Sparks, 672 P.2d 92, 94 (Utah
1983) .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In holding that the trial court erred in admitting the
preliminary hearing testimony of the State's chief witness at
trial, this Court misapplied or overlooked controlling authority
from the Utah Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court.
The Court's conclusion that the admission of the preliminary
hearing testimony occurred without the State establishing the
witness's unavailability and in violation of defendant's right of
confrontation is contrary to established law.
Because the Court did not apply controlling authority
to the question of admitting the preliminary hearing testimony,
it analyzed the suppression of evidence issue in terms of the
case being remanded to the district court for a new trial.
However, if controlling authority is applied to the former
question, a new trial is not warranted, and the suppression issue
should be disposed of in the manner argued for in the brief filed
by the State in response to defendant's opening brief.
-2-

INTRODUCTION
This petition for rehearing is submitted pursuant to

Utah R. ct. App. 35. in Brown v. Packard* denying reh'qr 4 Utah
292, 11 P. 512 (1886) , the Utah Supreme Court set forth the
standard for determining whether a petition for rehearing should
be granted:
To justify a rehearing, a strong case must be
made. We must be convinced that the court
failed to consider some material point in the
case, or that it erred in its conclusions, or
that some matter has been discovered which
was unknown at the time of the hearing.
4 Utah at 294, 11 P. at 512 (citation omitted).

In Cumminqs v.

Nielson. 42 Utah 157, 129 P. 619 (1913), the Supreme Court
stated:
To make an application for a rehearing is a
matter of right, and we have no desire to
discourage the practice of filing petitions
for rehearings in proper cases. When this
court, however, has considered and decided
all of the material questions involved in a
case, a rehearing should not be applied for,
unless we have misconstrued or overlooked
some material fact or facts, or have
overlooked some statute or decision which may
affect the result, or that we have based the
decision on some wrong principle of law, or
have either misapplied or overlooked
something which materially affects the
result. . . . If there are some reasons,
however, such as we have indicated above, or
other good reasons, a petition for a
rehearing should be promptly filed and, if it
is meritorious, its form will in no case be
scrutinized by this court.
42 Utah at 172-73, 129 P. at 624. The argument portion of this
brief will demonstrate that, based on these standards, the
State's petition for rehearing is properly before the Court and
should be granted.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT A PROSECUTION
WITNESS'S PRELIMINARY HEARING TESTIMONY WAS
ADMITTED AT TRIAL WITHOUT THE NECESSARY
FINDING OF UNAVAILABILITY AND IN VIOLATION OF
DEFENDANT'S RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION IS
CONTRARY TO ESTABLISHED LAW.
In the lower court, the State presented the following
evidence of its efforts to secure the attendance of defendant's
victim, Suzzanne McPerrson, at trial.

Sherry Brown, a legal

secretary with the Tooele County Attorney's uffice, personally
served a subpoena on McPerrson for the preliminary hearing while
r*cPerrson was in a local hospital shortly after the crime.

After

McPerrson had testified at the preliminary hearing, Brown
verbally informed her of a tentative trial date, with the
understanding that McPerrson would shortly thereafter give the
county attorney's office an address to which a "reminder"
subpoena could be sent.

Subsequently, McPerrson contacted the

county attorney, and a subpoena was sent to her in Mobile,
Alabama.

McPerrson acknowledged receipt of the subpoena four

days after it was sent in a telephone conversation with Brown.
During that conversation, Brown reviewed the date and location of
the trial with McPerrson and received assurances from her that
she would attend.

In the following weeks before trial, Brown

talked with ..cPerrson approximately eight times about the trial,
each time receiving a commitment from McPerrson that she would
attend voluntarily.

It was not until the morning of trial that

Brown learned from a police officer that McPerrson would not be

-4-

appearing.

The officer had received a long distance phone call

from McPerrson that morning, in which McPerrson indicated that
she would not be at trial because "she was afraid of the
defendant in the matter and . . • couldn't bring herself to come
in" (T. 14-19, 21-24).

Finally, the prosecutor did not utilize

the "Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from
Without a State in Criminal Proceedings" (hereinafter "Uniform
Act"), found in UTAH CODE ANN. S 77-21-1 sX £££*• (1982) (T. 3 ) .
The Court acknowledges the efforts of the prosecutor,
and even characterizes them as "thorough and in good faith."
Case, slip op. at 3.

Nevertheless, it reverses defendant's

conviction because (1) the prosecutor, by not utilizing the
Uniform Act, failed to demonstrate McPerrsonfs unavailability,
and (2) "[tlhe use of an audio tape of prior testimony without
corroboration deprived defendant of his right of confrontation
under the 6th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I
Section 12 of the Utah State Constitution."

!&• at 3, 4.

With

all due respect to the Court, this two-pronged holding appears to
be contrary to controlling authority from the Utah Supreme Court
and the United States Supreme Court.
In State v. Brooks. 638 P.2d 537 (Utah 1981), the Utah
Supreme Court clearly set forth the law applicable to the
admission of an unavailable witness's preliminary hearing
testimony at trial:
Defendant's right to confrontation is
guaranteed by the Utah Constitution, Article
I, Section 12, and by the Sixth Amendment to
the United States Constitution.

5-

In the context of federal constitutional
lawf the court in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S.
56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980),
(hereinafter Roberts) outlined a two-pronged
test to determine the admission of prior
testimony in relationship to confrontation
considerations. The first requirement is
that the witness must be unavailable; the
second requirement is that the testimony must
bear sufficient indicia of reliability to
permit its introduction at trial. Mancusi v.
£tUll£L£r 408 U.S. 204, 92 S.Ct. 2308, 38
L.Ed.2d 293 (1972)? Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S.
74, 91 S.Ct. 210, 27 L.Ed.2d 213 (1970);
Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 88 S.Ct. 1318,
20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968); Pointer v. Texas. 380
U.S. 400, 88 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923
(1965); Mattox v. United States. 156 U.S.
237, 15 S.Ct. 337, 39 L.Ed. 409 (1895). See
AiSfi State v. Mannion. 19 Utah 505, 57 P. 542
(1899) .
A state may construe its own
constitution more narrowly than the federal
constitution even though the provisions
involved may be similar. Nonetheless, the
two-pronged test in Roberts appears to be a
correct and reasonable standard to this
Court.
in state Vt PnisKorr 29 Utah 2d 395, 510
P.2d 929 (1973), we held that the testimony
of an unavailable witness given at the
preliminary hearing could be used at trial
provided prosecutorial authorities have made
a good faith effort to obtain his presence at
trial. The rule of review enunciated in
Gallegos v. Turner* Utah, 526 P.2d 1128
(1974), is that we will not reverse the
ruling of the trial judge that the efforts
were made in good faith in the absence of a
showing of clear abuse of discretion.
638 P.2d at 539.

These standards apply regardless of whether the

analysis proceeds under the state and federal constitutions or
under Utah R. Evid. 804. Brooks, 638 P.2d at 541-42 (holding
that constitutional analysis applied equally under former Utah R.
Evid. 63(3), a rule comparable to current Rule 804(b)(1)).
generally 4 J. Weinstein 6 Berger, WeinStein'S Evidence
-6-

See

S 804(a) 111 at 47-56 (1985) (summarizing federal case law
defining unavailability under Fed. R. Evid. 804(a)(5)).1
In holding that "the prosecutor did not make use of the
•reasonable means1 required to meet the definition of
•unavailability,•" Case, slip op. at 4, this Court neither states
nor applies the applicable standard of review, and makes no
effort to distinguish this case from state v. Chapman, 655 P.2d
1119 (Utah 1982) f which appears to require a result different
from that reached here.

Under Brooks, the trial courtfs

determination of unavailability will not be reversed absent "a
showing of clear abuse of discretion." 638 P.2d at 539 (emphasis
added).

When that standard is applied in conjunction with the

holding of Chapman, it is difficult to find any abuse of
discretion in defendant's case, let alone a clear abuse of
discretion.

In Chapman, the Supreme Court, indicating that there

was no inflexible requirement that the Uniform Act be utilized as
a condition precedent to the use of prior testimony, held that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that an
out-of-state witness was unavailable and that his preliminary
hearing testimony was admissible when the witness had
acknowledged receipt of a subpoena in the mail and the prosecutor
had no reason to question his availability prior to seven days
before
* The Utah Supreme Court has never construed Utah K. Evid.
804(a)(5); however, it has made clear that, in accordance with
the intent of the advisory committee for Utah's new rules of
evidence, it will "lookl] to the interpretations of the federal
rules by the federal courts to aid in interpreting the Utah
rules." State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 1333-34 (Utah 1986)
(citing State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313, 1317 (Utah 1986)).

-7-

trial*

Specifically, the Court stated:
We find that the trial court did not err
in determining that the second witness,
Richard Scoville, was "unavailable." Upon
receipt of the Utah subpoena, Scoville
affixed his signature to the line which
acknowledged his receipt of the subpoena and
his intention to comply with it. When
Scoville first contacted the county attorney
on February 26 he said he would attend the
trial. Because of these responses, the state
had no reason to question Scoville's
availability prior to seven days before
trial. After learning late on February 26
that Scoville would not attend and failing in
their attempts to contact Scoville's employer
on February 26 the state had only five days
to implement the Uniform Act. while it is
possible to imagine more concerted efforts by
the state to secure voluntary compliance, we
hold on these facts that the court did not
abuse its discretion in determining that the
state acted in good faith in attempting to
secure Scoville's attendance at trial.

655 P.2d at 1123-24.

In comparison, the State's efforts in

defendants case were far more concerted than those at issue in
Chapman. and the prosecutor had no reason to believe that
McPerrson would not appear until the day of trial, rather than
the five days 1 notice received in Chapman.

Although this wourt

states that it "believels] the permissive use of the Uniform Act
should continue to be the norm in Utah," Case, slip op. at 3, its
conclusion that McPerrson was not unavailable because the
prosecutor did not, with extremely short notice, implement the
Uniform Act effectively guts the holding of Chapman in favor of a
most inflexible rule which requires use of the Uniform Act in
nearly all cases.

££. State v. Gray. 616 S.W.2d 102 (Mo. App.

1981) (cited in Chapman. 655 P.2d at 1123, as authority contrary
to the rule adopted by the Utah Supreme Court).

-8-

The Court avoids the Chapman holding cited above by
alluding to the following language in that case:
Whenf howeverf the state receives a clear
message that the witness is aware of the
noncorapulsory effect of the subpoena and that
the witness intends not to comply, for
whatever reason, the state must either take
additional steps to secure voluntary
compliance, with appropriate assurances, or
resort to the more compulsory avenues offered
by the Uniform Act. Half-hearted last minute
efforts, as here, to confirm a witness*
intention not to comply are insufficient to
demonstrate good faith and override the
defendant's constitutional rights of
confrontation at trial.
655 P.2d at 1123.

The Court concludes that the prosecutor had "a

clear message" that McPerrson would not appear because of her
"lifestyle and nomadic habits," "the distance the victim would
have to travel to appear," and "[h]er financial condition [which]
evidenced a distinct lack of funds with which to travel."
slip op. at 3.

Case*

It is not at all clear upon what record evidence

the Court bases these conclusions.

The State is unable to find

anything in the record to indicate that either finances or
distance of travel were an obvious impedement to McPerrson's
appearance at trial, or that the prosecutor should have known
that they were.^

Furthermore, the only basis in the record for

concluding that McPerrson had "nomadic habits" is defendant's
testimony that she had indicated to him some difficulties with
other truckers from whom she had received rides and defense
^ Defendant has not argued this on appeal, and he did not do so
at trial. Moreover, normally the prosecutor's office pays for
the travel and lodging of an out-of-state witness. Indeed, $ 7721-3 requires that the witness be paid for travel and time
expended.
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counsel's statement prior to trial that the prosecution knew at
the time of preliminary hearing that McPerrson had not had a
permanent address for over eight years (T. 3-4, 147-49)•

First,

counsel's unsubstantiated statement concerning McPerrson's lack
of a permanent address should not be evidence upon which a
factual conclusion rests. £L££L State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 120
P.2d 285, 313 (1941) (remarks by counsel during opening statement
to the jury are not evidence).

Second, to the extent that it may

be inferred from defendant's testimony that McPerrson was
hitchhiking with truckers as she traveled around the country,
££££.# slip op. at 2, it cannot fairly be assumed from this
limited evidence that McPerrson was a "career" hitchhiker or had
such nomadic tendencies that she could not reasonably be trusted
to appear voluntarily at trial.

The extent or purpose of her

travel was never established in the record below.

In sum, the

Court appears to have arrived at conclusions of fact based on
speculation about matters outside the trial court record—
something the Supreme Court has indicated an appellate court
should not do.

Bingham, 684 P.2d at 46; Sparks, 672 P.2d at 94.

The second prong of the Court's holding, which
identifies a right of confrontation violation, Case, slip op. at
3, is perhaps more disturbing.

On appeal, defendant raised no

issue concerning the propriety of using an audio tape of prior
testimony or alleged undue reliance on the taped testimony by the
jury because it may have taken the tape into the jury room and
replayed it. He limited his argument to an attack on the trial
court's ruling concerning unavailability.

-10-

Br. of App. at 11-14.

It is well established in Utah that an appellate court generally
will not address issues not presented by a defendant on appeal*
£££r e.9., State V, ClPUflr 722 P.2d 750, 754 n. 3 (Utah 1986).
Nevertheless, this Court stated without qualification and with no
citations to supporting authority:
The use of an audio tape of prior testimony
without corroboration deprived defendant of
his right of confrontation under the 6th
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and
Article 1, Section 12 of the Utah State
Constitution. There was nothing and no one
to confront. If this tape was taken into the
jury room and was played, there is an
additional erroneous deprivation of the right
of confrontation and an over reliance on the
testimony by the jury.3
£a££.# slip op. at 3.

These rather broad statements of law, which

appear to be a primary basis for the Court's conclusion that the
prosecutor should have utilized the Uniform Act, are directly
contrary to State Yt PrOPkS and QhiO V. RpfrertSr 448 U.S. 56
(1980), which squarely hold that preliminary hearing testimony
may be admitted at trial for an unavailable witness without
violating a defendant's right of confrontation under the state
and federal constitutions.

Neither Brooks nor Roberts prohibits

the admission of an audio tape in lieu of a transcript, or

J

Again, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the tape
was taken into the jury room and played; the Court merely
speculates that this may have occurred. One cannot discern from
the record whether the jury even had the equipment necessary to
play the tape.

-11-

excludes the prior testimony if uncorroborated,*

And, defendant

does not argue, nor is there any indication in the record, tnat
the preliminary hearing suffered from any confrontational
defects.

Finally, simply because the prior testimony constituted

the primary evidence against defendant is of no consequence.
*hat was the case in both Brooks and Roberts.

See also

California v. Green. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
In effect, the Court has created a new constitutional
rule which is diametrically opposed to the one adopted by the
Utah Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court.

Although

an intermediate court of appeals is certainly free to criticize
the rulings of the superior appellate court, see, e.g.» Selby v.
Department of Motor Vehicles. 168 Cal. Rptr. 36, 37-38 (Cal. App.
1980), in performing the primary "error-correcting" function in a
two-tiered appellate system, it is not in a position to overrule
superior authority, and it generally should refrain from
performing its "law-declaring" function in cases of great moment.
£££. £LAt£ v. Grawien. 123 Wis.2d 428, 432, 367 N.W.2d 816, 818
(Wis. App. 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. §78-2a-3(3) (Supp. 1986)
(authorizing certification of issues to Supreme Court)•
4

The Court's statement that the victim's testimony was
uncorroborated appears to be incorrect. First, it is difficult
to understand how the Court could make such a determination
without knowing the content of her testimony. (As noted in the
opinion, her testimony was not transcribed for purposes of
appeal. Case, slip op. at 2.) Furthermore, assuming that
McPerrson's testimony established that defendant had assaulted
her, the testimony of a number of prosecution witnesses about her
physical condition immediately after the incident, as well as
evidence of screams heard coming from defendants motel room,
would constitute corroborative evidence (T. 32-39, 47-53, 58-63,
102-06). &££ Bi££JlS.# 638 P.2d at 539.

-12-

Therefore, whether or not the Court decides to reexamine its
holding concerning the unavailability of McPerrsonf it should
eliminate these erroneous statements of law concerning the right
of confrontation*

Beyond being contrary to settled precedent,

those statements are not necessary to the resolution of the only
issue raised by defendant on appeal —

i.e., whether the trial

court clearly abused its discretion in determining that ^cPerrson
was unavailable for the purpose of admitting her preliminary
hearing testimony.

POINT II
IF THE COURT APPLIES CONTROLLING AUTHORITY TO
THE PRIOR TESTIMONY ISSUE, REVERSAL OF
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION IS NOT WARRANTED;
THEREFORE, DEFENDANT'S SUPPRESSION ISSUE
SHOULD BE DISPOSED OF IN THE MANNER ARGUED
FOR IN THE BRIEF FILED BY THE STATE IN
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S OPENING BRIEF.
Based upon the arguments presented in Point I, the
Court's reversal of defendant's conviction on the prior testimony
appears to be incorrect,

therefore, defendant's claim that

evidence should have been suppressed need not be analyzed as it
was by the Court.

£&££, slip op at 4.

If the Court is inclined

to reexamine its holding on the prior testimony issue, the otate
respectfully requests that the suppression issue be disposed of
in the manner argued for in the brief filed by the State in
response to defendant's opening brief.

Br. or Resp. at 6-8

(attached as Appendix B ) •
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing discussion, it appears that
the Court in State v. Case either overlooked or misapprehended

-13-

controlling authority in concluding that the trial court
erroneously admitted the preliminary hearing testimony of an
absent prosecution witness*

Therefore, the Statefs petition for

rehearing should be granted, and the Court should either modify
its opinion and affirm defendant's conviction without further
argument or restore the case to the calendar for reargument or
resubmission.

Utah R. Ct. App. 35(c).

The State certifies that this petition is presented in
good faith and not for delay.

crftrr

RESPECTFULLY submitted this _ £ 2 J L _ _ T day of April,
1987.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

DAVID B. THOMPSON
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing Petition for Rehearing was mailed, postage prepaid, to
Alan K. Jeppesen, 200 North Main Street, Tooele, Utah 84074, this
__o22522~day of April, 1987.

^?6a^cJ
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

.r.v,

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

V

OOOOO
State of Utah,

/ . ,-' ,K<.

*67 APT 16 P4:4&

Plaintiff and Respondent,
OPINION
v.
William Silas Case,

AT7:r:.

• .•.•••:, .

Case No.

860201-CA

Defendant and Appellant.

FILED
APR 151987

Before Judges Davidson, Greenwood and Jackson.
DAVIDSON, Judge:

Timothy M. Shea
Clerk of the Court
Utah Court of Appeals

Defendant was convicted of the crime of aggravated
assault, a Felony of the Third Degree, in the District Court
and was sentenced to confinement in the Utah State Prison for
the statutory period. Defendant appeals claiming the trial
court erred in admitting evidence obtained in a warrantless and
unreasonable search and seizure. He also claims it was error
to allow the preliminary hearing testimony of the absent victim
to be used in trial. We reverse and remand.
William Silas Case, a long haul trucker, was proceeding
east on Interstate Route 80 during the early morning hours of
February 6, 1986. Severe weather conditions caused him to exit
the road at a truck stop in Lakepoint, Tooele County, Utah.
Case subsequently took a room at the Oquirrh Motor Inn in
Lakepoint under the name Bill Freeman.
At approx imately 9:30 p.m. on the same day, the motel's
resident manage r was telephoned by another guest who reported
what sounded li ke screaming coming from the room registered to
Case. The mana ger contacted defendant by telephone and the
latter reported he had a "crazy woman" in his room and that the
manager should contact the police. Shortly after the
conversation wi th defendant, the victim, Suzzanne McPerrson,
appeared in the manager's apartment nude and bleeding from
cuts. The mana ger and her husband rendered first aid to the
victim. During this time period the police were notified.
Four members of the Tooele County Sheriff's Office
responded to the report. Defendant met the officers on the
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second floor balcony outside of his room. After ascertaining
that defendant wasn't armed and without asking his permission
nor obtaining a search warrant, the officers entered his room
and obtained evidence.
The trial record indicates the victim had a practice of
hitchhiking with truckers as she traveled around the country.
Upon her arrival at the truck stop she contacted defendant by
CB radio and he gave her shelter in his motel room. Alcoholic
beverages were purchased and consumed by both victim and
defendant. After a struggle, the victim ran from defendant's
room into the managerfs apartment. She subsequently told one
of the officers that defendant had tried to kill her.
Defendant claimed the victim was attempting suicide which he
tried to prevent.
Ms. McPerrson was personally served a subpoena while in
the hospital. She appeared and gave testimony at the
preliminary hearing. At the conclusion of that proceeding, the
victim was given a tentative trial date by the criminal legal
secretary for the Tooele County Attorney. The victim left an
address and telephone number in Mobile, Alabama. She was
mailed a subpoena at the Mobile, Alabama address which was
acknowledged by telephone. Between the preliminary hearing and
the date set for trial, the victim contacted the secretary
approximately eight times. On each occasion she indicated a
willingness to voluntarily appear at trial. On the morning of
the trial, the victim telephoned and stated she would not be
present. Because of the victim's absence the trial court
allowed the cassette recording of her preliminary hearing
testimony to be played before the jury, over the objection of
defense counsel. The conviction and this appeal ensued.
The trial record does not contain any information
concerning the content of the victim's testimony at the
preliminary hearing other than it was played to the jury. The
cassette was admitted into evidence, likely taken into the jury
room during deliberation and may have been played there as well
as during the trial.
The crux of this case can be found in Utah R. Evid. 804
(b)(1), which permits the recorded testimony of an unavailable
witness to be used if it was given at another hearing of the
same or different proceeding and if the opposing party had an
opportunity to develop the testimony through cross
examination. Rule 804 (a)(5) defines "unavailability- in part
as the witness being absent and "the proponent of his statement
has been unable to procure his attendance by process or other
reasonable means."
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Although the Tooele County Attorney*s Office personally
served the victim with a subpoena to insure her attendance at
the preliminary hearing, that office did not do so for the
trial. It is not denied that the prosecutor attempted to keep
close contact with Ms. McPerrson while she was in Alabama
during the period between the preliminary hearing and the
trial. A subpoena was sent by mail which was acknowledged by
the victim. The numerous telephone calls all caused Tooele
County to believe this critical witness would appear. But, the
prosecutor's mailing of a subpoena was not effective service.
At his disposal was the Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of
Witnesses from Without a State in Criminal Proceedings, Utah
Code Ann. § 77-21-1 et seq. (1982). This was not used.
The Utah Supreme Court, in State v. Chapman, 655 P.2d
1119, 1122 (Utah 1982), stated that use of the Uniform Act is
permissive. However, that Court also indicated a preference
for the Uniform Act if the state •receives a clear message"
that the out-of-state witness wonft comply with the mailed
subpoena and appropriate assurances to secure voluntary
compliance might not be effective. Here, the state*s efforts
to ensure the victim's attendance at the trial would appear to
be thorough and in good faith. The mailed subpoena and the
numerous telephone contacts indicate a concern on the part of
the prosecutor that the witness in fact be present.
Defendant could only be found guilty through the victim's
testimony that he stabbed her and that she was not in the
process of trying to end her life. The right of confrontation
is most critical in a situation such as this. Two conflicting
stories are told with little or no corroborative evidence
available. The jury must decide whom to believe. It is
vitally important that the witness be present and subject to
cross examination in the presence of the jury. The use of an
audio tape of prior testimony without corroboration deprived
defendant of his right of confrontation under the 6th Amendment
of the U. S. Constitution and Article 1 Section 12 of the Utah
State Constitution. There was nothing and no one to confront.
If this tape was taken into the jury room and was played, there
is an additional erroneous deprivation of the right of
confrontation and an over reliance on the testimony by the
jury. While we believe the permissive use of the Uniform Act
should continue to be the norm in Utah, this is a situation in
which the prosecution should have used it. Ms. McPerrson's
lifestyle and nomadic habits make it clear that she possessed
the potential to disappear or refuse to appear for trial. The
prosecutor was aware of the distance the victim would have to
travel to be present. Her financial condition evidenced a
distinct lack of funds with which to travel. On balance, the
prosecutor should have been wary of this witness despite her
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telephone assurances. The use of the Uniform Act would have
been the proper procedure to apply and# without its use, the
prosecutor did not make use of the "reasonable means* required
to meet the definition of "unavailability."
We need not analyze the second prong of the test which
determines whether the testimony of an absent witness may be
admitted. We have already determined the victim was not
"unavailable", therefore, whether such testimony bore
sufficient indicia of reliability is not addressed. State v.
JBXfifllSfi, 638 P.2d 537 (Utah 1981).
Because we remand for a new trial, the issue of the
propriety of using evidence taken from the motel room is
examined. The State, in its appellate brief, concedes there is
some question whether the evidence obtained in the warrantless
search of defendants room should have been suppressed pursuant
to Utah R. Criro. P. 12(g). We agree that there were no exigent
circumstances present that necessitated an entry into the motel
room without a search warrant. State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175,
179 (Utah 1983). The trial record shows Case was on the balcony
outside of the room when the police arrived. He was unarmed
and cooperative. In this situation the officers should have
attempted to get defendants permission to enter,or failing
that, obtained a search warrant. We hold that the Motion to
Suppress evidence taken from the motel room should have been
granted.
We reverse and remand to the District Court for a new
trial on the matter.

Richard C. Davidson, Judge

WE CONCUR:

Norman H. Jackson, Judge

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
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APPENDIX B

w i t n e s s was "unavailable" and t h a t h i s preliminary hearing
testimony was admissible when the w i t n e s s had acknowledged
r e c e i p t of a subpoena in the mail and the prosecutor had no
reason t o q u e s t i o n h i s a v a i l a b i l i t y prior to seven days before
trial.

Chapman further held t h a t there was no i n f l e x i b l e

requirement that the Uniform Act be u t i l i z e d as a condition
precedent t o the use of prior testimony.

Under Chapman, the

S t a t e made reasonable and good f a i t h e f f o r t s to secure
McPhearson's attendance a t t r i a l .

I t had no reason t o b e l i e v e

that she would not appear u n t i l the morning of

trial.

Accordingly, t h i s Court should uphold the lower c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n
concerning McPhearson f s preliminary hearing testimony.

Defendant

simply has f a i l e d t o show any abuse of d i s c r e t i o n , l e t alone a
clear abuse of d i s c r e t i o n — the relevant standard of review.
Galleqos v. Turner, 526 P.2d 1128, 1129-30 (Utah 1 9 7 4 ) .
POINT II
DEFENDANT FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE
TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO SUPPRESS CERTAIN
EVIDENCE REQUIRES REVERSAL OF HIS CONVICTION.
In Point I of h i s brief

(Brief of Appellant a t 4 - 1 1 ) ,

defendant argues that the t r i a l court committed error when i t
admitted evidence obtained in a warrantless search of h i s motel
room by p o l i c e o f f i c e r s s h o r t l y after McPhearson had run from
that room.

Beyond h i s f a i l u r e to i d e n t i f y s p e c i f i c a l l y

the

evidence he claims was improperly admitted,2 defendant i s

guilty

2 For i n s t a n c e , defendant appears t o challenge the a d m i s s i b i l i t y
of photographs that were taken during the search; however, a f t e r
making h i s motion t o suppress at t r i a l , he s t i p u l a t e d t o the
admission of those photographs (T. 7 5 ) .
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of an even more b a s i c error on appeal: he f a i l s t o present any
argument that the a l l e g e d l y erroneous admission of the challenged
evidence c o n s t i t u t e d r e v e r s i b l e error in l i g h t of a l l
evidence presented.

the

I t i s a fundamental r u l e that the erroneous

admission of evidence may n e v e r t h e l e s s be harmless e r r o r .
S t a t e v. N i c k l e s , 43 Utah Adv. Rep. 20, 2 4 ,
(1986)

P.2d

See
,

( c i t i n g S t a t e v. Hutchison, 655 P.2d 635 (Utah 1 9 8 2 ) ) ;

Utah R. Evid. 1 0 3 ( a ) ; Utah R. Crim. P. 3 0 ( a ) .
Given t h i s Court's d e c i s i o n in S t a t e v. Harris y 671
P.2d 175 (Utah 1983), and the well e s t a b l i s h e d p r i n c i p l e i n Utah
t h a t , with respect t o p o l i c e s e a r c h e s , a motel room i s afforded
p r o t e c t i o n similar t o that given o n e ' s home, S t a t e v. Folkes f 565
P.2d 1125, 1127 (Utah 1 9 7 7 ) , c e r t , denied, 434 U.S. 9 7 1 , the
S t a t e must concede t h a t , under the f a c t s presented, there i s some
q u e s t i o n whether the evidence obtained in the w a r r a n t l e s s search
of defendant's room should have been suppressed under Utah R.
Crim. P. 1 2 ( g ) , the r u l e that c o n t r o l s such q u e s t i o n s .

However,

even if error were assumed in t h i s regard, r e v e r s a l i s not
warranted.

Defendant has provided the Court with no meaningful

a p p e l l a t e record of Ms. McPhearson's testimony which, i t seems
obvious from a review of the t r i a l t r a n s c r i p t , must have been the
bulk of the S t a t e ' s evidence a g a i n s t him.

Consequently,

the

Court has no means of reviewing the s u f f i c i e n c y of the S t a t e ' s
evidence absent that which defendant c h a l l e n g e s or of determining
whether there l i k e l y would have been a d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t in
defendant's t r i a l without the a l l e g e d e v i d e n t i a r y error.
N i c k l e s , 43 Utah Adv. Rep. at 24; Utah R. Evid. 1 0 3 ( a ) ; Utah R.
Crim. P. 3 0 ( a ) .
-7-

Furthermore, defendant is not able to show, by
reference to the appellate record, that he was prejudiced by the
alleged erroneous admission of evidence —
obliged to do on appeal.

something that he is

Ibid. See also State v. Griffin, 626

P.2d 478, 483 (Utah 1981) (Wilkins, J., concurring in the result)
(holaing that introduction of fruits of unlawful search and
seizure was harmless error, in that there was sufficient
untainted evidence to sustain the defendants' convictions).
Because defendant has failed to carry the burden of demonstrating
that reversible error occurred below, Jones, 657 P.2d at 1267
(due either to an inability to do so or to the absence of an
adequate record on appeal, s_ee State v. Wulf f enstein, 657 P. 2d
289, 293 (Utah 1982), cert, denied, 460 U.S. 1044 (1983)), the
Court should hold that, even if it were assumed the trial court
erred in admitting the challenged evidence, defendant has not
presented grounds for reversal of his conviction.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing arguments,
c o n v i c t i o n should be affirmed.

defendant's

/_,—-
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